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Abstract
Subjectivism as an unavoidable feature of ecological statistics.— We approach here the handling of previous information 
when performing statistical inference in ecology, both when dealing with model specification and selection, and when 
dealing with parameter estimation. We compare the perspectives of this problem from the frequentist and Bayesian 
schools, including objective and subjective Bayesians. We show that the issue of making use of previous information 
and making a priori decisions is not only a reality for Bayesians but also for frequentists. However, the latter tend to 
overlook this because of the common difficulty of having previous information available on the magnitude of the effect 
that is thought to be biologically relevant. This prior information should be fed into a priori power tests when looking for 
the necessary sample sizes to couple statistical and biological significances. Ecologists should make a greater effort 
to make use of available prior information because this is their most legitimate contribution to the inferential process. 
Parameter estimation and model selection would benefit if this was done, allowing a more reliable accumulation of 
knowledge, and hence progress, in the biological sciences. 
Key words: Ecology, Previous information, Frequentists, Bayesians, Parameter estimation, Hypothesis testing 
Resumen
La subjetividad como característica inevitable de los análisis estadísticos en ecología.— En este trabajo abordamos 
la gestión de información previa al realizar inferencia estadística en ecología, tanto en la especificación y la selección 
del modelo como en la estimación de los parámetros. Comparamos las perspectivas que aplican a esta problemática 
la escuela Frecuentista y la Bayesiana, que comprende a los bayesianos objetivos y subjetivos. Mostramos que la 
problemática de utilizar información previa y tomar decisiones a priori no es solo una realidad para los bayesianos, 
sino también para los frecuentistas. Sin embargo, estos últimos tienden a pasar por alto esta cuestión debido a la 
dificultad habitual de encontrar información previa sobre la magnitud del efecto que se considera relevante desde el 
punto de vista biológico. Esta información previa debería utilizarse en las pruebas de potencia a priori para buscar los 
tamaños de muestra óptimos para alcanzar la significación estadística y biológica necesaria. Los ecólogos deberían 
hacer un mayor esfuerzo por hacer uso de dicha información previa, pues es su contribución más legítima al proceso 
inferencial. De esta manera, la estimación de parámetros y la selección de modelos se verían beneficiadas, lo que 
permitiría que el proceso de aprendizaje fuera más fiable y, por tanto, que las ciencias biológicas pudieran progresar. 
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It has become more and more common worldwide in 
academic departments of biology and several other 
sciences to question whether frequentist statistics 
is the right tool to solve our ecological questions or 
whether Bayesian statistics should be used instead 
(Efron, 1986; Clark, 2005; Fidler et al., 2006; Hobbs 
& Hilborn, 2006; Burnham & Anderson, 2014). Apart 
from the conceptual and methodological differences 
between these two approaches, a question of great 
interest in order to make best use of our costly–to–
obtain field data is how to handle previous information 
when performing statistical inference in ecology. 
Previous information and model specification
The first scenario in which ecologists are forced to use 
their previous knowledge, whether they are adopting a 
Bayesian or a frequentist point of view, is when perfor-
ming model specification. For any ecological problem, it 
is important to set an adequate model to work with, and 
this decision implies some previous knowledge about the 
problem. Also, when we are selecting a model —and 
we cannot usually consider every possible model— 
choosing a set of adequate models from which to select 
the best one is also a matter of previous information 
(subjectivism). This step is important because the result 
can be biased by this decision. For instance, when 
adopting a frequentist approach, the whole process of 
model (= hypothesis) selection, based, for example, on 
Akaike’s Information Criteria, could be biased if a wrong 
set of hypotheses has been previously selected. As a 
result, the best thing ecologists can do is to trust in their 
cumulated experience on the study question and system, 
and define and contrast the set of hypotheses that is 
most adequate with the information so far available. 
Previous information and parameter estimation 
for objective and subjective Bayesians
Another scenario where it is necessary to handle previous 
information is when assessing data available for the para-
meters. In the Bayesian approach, this is done by introdu-
cing a prior distribution for the parameters, although in the 
frequentist approach this can be somewhat trickier, and 
sometimes cannot be done. Let’s review how assessing 
previous information for the parameters can be performed 
in both frameworks. Making use of previous information 
is considered one of the main characteristics of Bayesian 
statistics. Within this framework, the Bayes' theorem is 
used to combine the likelihood (a function that measures 
our trust in a parameter value given our data) and prior 
information (i.e. the probability distribution of our parameter) 
to obtain a posterior probability distribution of our parameter 
given our data. Depending when and how we introduce 
our previous information, there are two approaches within 
the Bayesian framework. Subjective Bayesians argue that 
one can define a prior distribution for unknown parameters 
according to personal experience and impression, recogni-
zing that the opinion of experts has a value and it is better 
than nothing. This is highly criticized by frequentists, who 
claim a more objective procedure. It is also one of the 
reasons why non–statisticians avoid Bayesian methods. 
An objective Bayesian approach is then an attempt to 
unify frequentist and Bayesian statistics, as pointed out by 
Bayarri & Berger (2004). Objective Bayesians defend the 
idea that no other information should be considered apart 
from that introduced during model specification. As stated 
in Berger (2006), 'the most familiar element of the objective 
Bayesian school is the use of objective prior distributions, 
designed to be minimally informative in some sense'. This 
procedure provides similar results (even exactly the same 
results under some circumstances) to classical frequentist 
analyses, although parameters are treated as random 
variables. In addition to allowing a non–subjective point of 
view, the objective Bayesian approach can also be useful 
in scenarios where choosing priors for our parameters is 
difficult or even unfeasible. For instance, in the presence 
of a large number of parameters a subjective specification 
of all priors could be too time–consuming. Alternatively, it 
would be more practical to invest time in improving model 
specification (Berger & Pericchi, 2001). However, whenever 
good previous information about parameters is available, it 
is important to make use of it, and the Bayesian subjective 
approach could be a good tool to achieve this goal. 
Prior information and parameter estimation 
in frequentist analyses
In the frequentist framework, assessing previous infor-
mation for the parameters is different from the Bayesian 
approach but, importantly, also existent. Many ecologists 
feel that this problem of dealing with previous information 
about parameters is not present when using frequentist 
methods. We think, however, that introducing this sort 
of previous information is the largest contribution that 
ecologists can make to the inferential process. The main 
situation in which one can introduce previous information 
about parameters in the frequentist world is when see-
king the right sample size needed to test informed null 
hypotheses during the stage of experimental design. In 
this case, prior information about the magnitude of the 
effect that is considered to be biologically relevant needs 
to be introduced. The sample size can be chosen by 
running a priori power tests (note that here we mean 
'a priori' power tests, rather than 'a posteriori' power 
tests, a highly criticized procedure). For this purpose, 
the magnitude of interest of the effect is used (Steidl et 
al., 1997; Thomas, 1997; Peterman, 1990; Nakagawa & 
Foster, 2004). Note that this sort of prior information is 
intrinsic to frequentist analyses because it is intended to 
maximize the power of the tests. In the Bayesian context, 
as by construction there is not power of tests, the issue of 
a small sample size is solved by incorporating previous 
knowledge through more informative prior distributions. 
The problem is that using a priori tests and the magnitude 
of effect is seldom done in the real world of ecological 
statistics, because ecologists seldom know the magnitude 
of the effect that corresponds to a biologically relevant 
effect is (e.g. Martínez–Abraín, 2007, 2008, 2014). This 
is easier to know in experimental (Beaumont & Rannala, 
2004) and production–based sciences (such as animal 
breeding science (Blasco, 2001, 2005) than when dealing 
with free–ranging wild species. What is the biologically 
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relevant difference between the wing lengths of two 
bird populations? We simply do not know. So basically, 
the vast majority of ecologists often cannot inform their 
analyses better (Martínez–Abraín, 2013). That is why we 
ecologists end up using uninformed null hypotheses of 
equality to zero (Anderson et al., 2000), and hence get 
the feeling that in a frequentist framework, the problem 
of dealing with previous information is not an issue. It is, 
however, but we are forced to overlook it and use null 
hypothesis testing in a poor way because of the types 
of problems and data we deal with. 
Conclusions
Irrespective of which statistical inference approach one 
decides to use to estimate a parameter or to contrast 
hypotheses, one cannot avoid the uncomfortable step 
of making rather subjective decisions in the scientific 
process of solving questions. All the information from past 
experiments and observations, performed by ourselves 
or by others, is of great value, and it is the ecologist’s 
task to make the best possible use of this information. 
To show a practical example that affects our research 
with Mediterranean seabirds, the finding by Ruiz et al. 
(2000) that the first egg in Audouin's gull Larus audouinii 
decreased in size by 5 cm3 when food was particularly 
scarce during clutch formation is a valid piece of previous 
information that can and should be used when assessing 
differences in egg size between Audouin’s gull populations 
in the future. In this case, we would use this value as 
a guiding clue when assessing if the difference in the 
mean egg size between two populations is biologically 
relevant. Specifically, we would perform a priori power 
tests, with 5 cm3 as our effect size of interest (instead of 
using zero differences between populations as our default 
reference), and will determine the sample sizes required 
to obtain statistically significant results if (and only if) the 
difference between the two study populations is at least 
of that magnitude (5 cm3). Alternatively, a 'safe' arbitrary 
minimum percentage of change in egg size could be es-
tablished by consensus among researchers if we do not 
have a concrete reference value of effect size available 
from previous studies. This is, in fact, our most legitimate 
contribution to a process that, in all other respects, is in 
the hands of statisticians. It is good that we acknowledge 
for once that in the presence of previous information, 
we do have proper tools to handle it, and that both the 
precision of our parameter estimates and the results of 
our hypothesis contrasts can improve substantially if we 
focus more on this slippery but fundamental compartment 
of our daily research.
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